Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers
Volume 8

Issue 2

Article 2

4-1-1991

Eternity and Simultaneity
Brian Leftow

Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy

Recommended Citation
Leftow, Brian (1991) "Eternity and Simultaneity," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers: Vol. 8 : Iss. 2 , Article 2.
DOI: 10.5840/faithphil19918220
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol8/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange.

ETERNITY AND SIMULTANEITY
Brian Leftow

Boethius and later medieval writers assert that God is timeless. Yet in the
course of modelling God's knowledge on human observation, they assert that
God sees temporal events which are really present for Him to see. This entails
that though God's acts of knowledge are not temporally simultaneous with
temporal events, they are in some other sense simultaneous with them. I
explore the attempt of Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann to explain
this other sort of simultaneity between eternal and temporal entities, then
develop an alternate account of the relations of time and eternity.

Boethius, Aquinas and a host of other medieval luminaries hold that God is
not located in time. That is, they assert that though God exists, there is no
time at which God exists.l One project for which Boethius and his compatriots
found this claim important was that of showing that divine foreknowledge of
our future is compatible with genuinely free human action.
The claim that foreknowledge and freedom are not compatible can be based
on these premisses:
1. There are truths about future human actions.

2. Necessarily, God at all times believes all and only truths. 2
3. What is past is beyond any human being's power to affect.

For suppose that one truth about future actions is that
P. On September 26, 1999, at 1:05 p.m., George feeds some ducks.

If God at all times believes all truths, then God believed P yesterday. If God
is necessarily omniscient, it is not possible that God believed P and yet P is
false; in any possible world in which God believes that on September 26,
1999, at 1:05 p.m., George feeds some ducks, George does then feed some
ducks. So George can avoid his fowl fate only if George can effect it that
yesterday God did not believe that P. But per (3), what is past is beyond any
human's power to affect. It follows, then, that George cannot avoid feeding
ducks. On a libertarian view of freedom, one does an act freely only if it is
in one's power to avoid doing it. So on such a view of freedom, it seems,
God's having foreknowledge entails that George does not act freely; despite
appearances, the ducks are not getting a free lunch. Parallel arguments will
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work for any human action of which it is at some time true that someone will
do it.
Boethius and his followers block this argument by denying that God is in
time. If God is not in time, then while God necessarily believes all and only
truths, there is no time at which He believes these things: (2) is false. If God
is not in time, God's beliefs do not occur at the same time as anything, and
so do not occur at any time in our past. Thus freedom is saved.
Well and good. But we want to know just how a timeless God manages to
have true beliefs about events in time. Boethius and the rest explain this on
the model of observation. Boethius states that an eternal being is
always present to itself and (has) the infinity of mobile time present to it. 3

Thus (in a famous image) an eternal God has all of time spread before Him
as a man atop a hill has all of a road before his gaze; both have knowledge
just by seeing what is there to be seen. Aquinas writes on the same subject
that
etemity ... comprises all time ... all things that are in time are present to God
from eternity ... because His glance is carried from eternity over all things as
they are in their presentiality.4

Aquinas clearly is saying more than that God is aware of temporal things. He
is saying that God is aware of temporal things because they are really present
for Him to observe, even as you see this page because it is really present for
you to see. s Now if a temporal thing is really present to God, it seems to
follow that God and that thing exist simultaneously. We thus have what is at
least a paradox. To solve the freedom-foreknowledge conundrum, Boethius
et al. deny that God's existence is simultaneous with temporal events. Yet to
explain how foreknowledge is possible, Boethius and company affirm that
God's existence is simultaneous with temporal events. Charity dictates saying
that Boethius and the rest are not just contradicting themselves, and so have
at least two sorts of simultaneity in mind. This raises a question, though.
What kind of simultaneity relates a timeless God and temporal things? What
do "this thing is present to God" or "God and this thing exist simultaneously"
assert, if not "God and this thing exist at the same time"?
This may sound like a merely technical question. I think that it is of broader
import, for at least three reasons. First, if Boethius and friends cannot adequately explain their second sort of simultaneity and ground it in a plausible
theory about the relations of eternity and time, their escape from contradiction
will seem ad hoc and unpersuasive. There is also a second way in which the
question affects how we evaluate the Boethian treatment of foreknowledge
and freedom. Boethius, Aquinas and the rest picture the whole of time spread
before a timeless God's gaze. Thus they see all times, including both our
future and our past, as related to God's vision in the same way. So for
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Boethius et al., if a timeless God's believings are simultaneous with our
future, they are also simultaneous with our past. If they are simultaneous with
our past, though, we may have the freedom-foreknowledge problem all over
again. For if God's believings are simultaneous with our past, then perhaps
they are after all in our past, or are as if past in a relevant way. If the
freedom-foreknowledge problem does not arise anew, we want to be told
why. To tell us why, Boethius and company must explain their second sort
of simultaneity. Only if this sort of simultaneity does not underwrite the claim
that God's believings are in our past or as if so is the Boethian resolution of
the freedom-foreknowledge problem finally viable.
Let me try to clarify this "as if past" status. Alvin Plantinga argues this
way:
Suppose in fact Paul will mow his lawn in 1995. Then the proposition "God
(eternally) knows that Paul mows in 1995" is now true. That proposition,
furthermore, was true eighty years ago .... Since what is past is necessary, it
is now necessary that this proposition was true eighty years ago. But it is
logically necessary that if this proposition was true eighty years ago, then
Paul mows in 1995. Hence his mowing then is necessary in just the way the
past is. But then it neither now is nor in future will be within Paul's power
to refrain from mowing. 6

The key premisses of Plantinga's argument are that
4. "God (eternally) knows that Paul mows in 1995" is now true, and
5. If "God (eternally) knows that Paul mows in 1995" is now true, it was
true 80 years ago.

According to Boethius and his allies, God is related in the same way to all times.
This supports (5): if God's relation to time is such as to permit the truth of (4),
it would equally have let "God (eternally) knows that Paul mows in 1995" be
true 80 years ago. If (4) is true, then, a timeless God is as if in our past; though
He is not literally in our past, truths about Him have for us the necessity of the
past. To fully vindicate the Boethian response, then, one must show how a
Boethian can plausibly deny (4). I will suggest below that on one construal of
Boethius' second sort of simultaneity, a Boethian can do this.
A third reason to explore Boethius' second sort of simultaneity is that if
God and temporal things cannot in any sense exist simultaneously, one must
withdraw or seriously qualify either the claim that God is timeless or the
claim that God and temporal creatures are present to one another. The first
claim is one of the main contributions of later Greek philosophical thought
to orthodox Christian theology. The second seems basic to the Biblical picture
of God as aware of and interacting with temporal creatures. Thus at this rather
dry, abstract juncture, we have a test of whether one heirloom of Greek
metaphysics really can cohere with the heritage of Hebrew monotheism in a
single conception of God.
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In their paper "Eternity," Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann offer a
creative, sophisticated attempt to shed light on timeless-temporal simultaneity.71 will examine their effort and recommend an alternate account of such
simultaneity. Stump and Kretzmann base their account of eternal-temporal
(ET-) simultaneity on a metaphysical picture of the relation of time and
eternity. This picture has two chief components, the claim that eternity is
infinite life without succession and the Einsteinian claim that simultaneity is
relative to reference-frames. Let me explain these components and the picture
of which they are part.
I. Stump and Kretzmann on time and eternity

I will first layout the concept of infinite succession less life. A life's events,
states and processes succeed one another if and only if they do not occur at
once. Iff some events etc. in a life occur at or before t, and some at or after
t+ 1, when t+ 1 succeeds t, the second set of events etc. succeeds the first. A
life contains succession, then, iff not all parts of it occur at once. By contrast,
iff a life lacks succession, all of it occurs at once: no phase of it is earlier
than any other phase of it. Eternal life, then, is a timelike extension without
earlier and later parts. As any life located in time has earlier and later parts,
a life without succession is atemporal, i.e. without temporal location and so
without temporal duration. Only if a life has earlier and later parts is some
of it past and some of it future. If a life lacks earlier and later parts, all of it
is present. Again, if a life begins, there is a time at which it begins; if a life
ends, there is a time at which it ends. Hence an atemporal life can neither
begin nor end. A duration without beginning or end, one would think, is in
some sense infinite. Thus an eternal life is a single infinitely extended present.
But again, though an eternal life is a genuine infinite extension, it is partless. 8
These claims raise many questions, and many philosophers doubt that anything could satisfy the description here assembled. But all I want to do at
present is to set out the picture of time-eternity relations this concept generates. Let us make the common assumption that only that of time which is
present is actual. We can then picture time and Boethian eternity as
two infinite parallel horizontal lines, the upper one of which, representing
eternity, is entirely and uniformly a strip of light (where light represents" ,an
indivisible present. .. ), while the lower one, representing time, is dark everywhere except for a dot of light moving steadily along it. 9

As the moving dot of light glances on each portion of the lower strip, that
portion of the strip is simultaneous with the upper strip, or more precisely
with the whole of the upper strip: as the upper strip is ex hypothesi a single
indivisible duration, if any of it is simultaneous with the dot, all of it is. Were
the lower dot simultaneous with only part of the upper strip, part of the upper
strip would be earlier than the dot-simultaneous part and part would be later,
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and so the upper strip would contain relations of earlier and later. Because
each dot-location is simultaneous with the whole upper strip, each is simultaneous with precisely the same portion of eternal duration, namely all of it.
Yet the dot-locations are not temporally simultaneous with each other. They
remain discrete, one after another, on the lower line. Nor are they simultaneous as the upper line and the lower dot are, since this latter relation,
ET-simultaneity, links an eternal and a temporal term, not two temporal
relata. In this metaphysical picture, then, the relation of being-somehow-simultaneous is not transitive. That dot-locations are ET-simultaneous with the
same upper line does not entail that they are in any sense simultaneous with
one another.
This view of the relation between time and eternity also raises a great many
questions, most of which will not be discussed here. One which will (because
its answer introduces ideas which we use later) is this: how can dot-locations
be simultaneous with the same portion of the upper strip and yet be in no
way simultaneous with one another?

II. The relativity of simultaneity
To answer this question, Stump and Kretzmann invoke the Einsteinian
thesis of the relativity of simultaneity. 10 According to the special theory of
relativity, the question of whether two events occur at the same time does
not have only one answer. Rather, its answer depends on one's state of
motion. Stump and Kretzmann invite us to consider this standard example: a
train passes by an observer standing still relative to the ground. The train is
struck at both ends by lightning, just when (the observer would say that) the
train's mid-point is directly in front of this observer. Light from the front and
rear lightning-strikes travels the same distance (1/2 the length of the train)
at the same speed (light-speed) to reach the observer. Thus the light of the
front strike reaches the ground observer just when the light of the rear strike
does; this observer sees the strikes at once. In this person's experience, then,
the strikes are simultaneous.
There is another observer sitting down within the train. The train is at rest
relative to this observer, since he is moving exactly as it is. Relative to the
ground observer, the train is travelling at 3/5ths the speed of light. The
train-observer, then, is moving toward the front lightning strike and away
from the rear one at 3/5ths light speed (as the ground observer sees it). So
light from the front strike reaches the observer on the train some time before
light from the rear strike does. If the train observer sees both strikes, then,
he sees the front one some time before he sees the rear one. In this person's
experience, the two events are not simultaneous.
For the ground-observer, the two lightning-strikes occur at once. For the
train-observer, they do not occur at once. According to special relativity,
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neither observer sees things distortedly or makes a mistaken judgment of
simultaneity. Both are right. The events are truly simultaneous relative to the
ground observer and truly non-simultaneous relative to an observer who is
in motion relative to the ground observer. Given special relativity, there is
no such relation as absolute simultaneity, or simultaneity regardless of point
of view. There is only simultaneity relative to different observers in motion
relative to one another, or more generally to different objects in relative
motion. Let me now introduce a term which will prove useful: an inertial
frame of reference is a system of objects at rest relative to one another. Thus
the ground and the ground observer constitute one inertial reference-frame,
while the train and the train-observer constitute another. What the example
shows is that there is no absolute simultaneity, but only simultaneity relative
to different frames of reference.
Given special relativity, the relation of being-somehow-simultaneous (i.e.
being simultaneous relative to some reference-frame) is intransitive. For all
x, y and z, if x is somehow simultaneous with y and y is somehow simultaneous with z, we cannot infer that x is somehow simultaneous with z. For it
could be that x is simultaneous with y in one reference-frame, y is simultaneous with z in another and there is no third frame of reference in which x
and z are simultaneous. If being-somehow-simultaneous is intransitive, then
there is just no problem in the claim that dot-locations ET-simultaneous with
the same portion of the upper strip are in no way simultaneous with one
another. There only appeared to be a problem because the question was posed
in the outmoded terms of absolute simultaneity and transitive somehow-simultaneity.
III. The Stump-Kretzmann definition
Stump and Kretzmann try to capture their picture of time and eternity in
their definition of ET-simultaneity. Taking eternity to be like a frame of
reference in addition to any temporal reference frames, they define ET-simultaneity thus:
For every x and for every y, x and yare ET-simultaneous iff
(i)

either x is eternal and y is temporal, or vice versa; and

(ii) for some observer, A, in the unique eternal reference frame, x and yare
both present-i.e. either x is eternally present and y is observed as
temporally present, or vice versa; and
(iii) for some observer, B, in one of the infinitely many temporal reference
frames, x and yare both present, i.e. either x is observed as eternally
present and y is temporally present, or vice-versa. ll

This definition directly reflects Stump and Kretzmann's picture of time and
eternity; it expresses, or tries to express, what it is for the top strip of light
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in Stump and Kretzmann's image to be together with the lower light-dot. This
definition may seem to say that x and yare ET-simultaneous because x and
yare simultaneous both in the eternal and in a temporal reference frame. But
on this reading, eternal x would exist in time and temporal y would exist in
eternity. Stump and Kretzmann deny that this occurs:
Nixon is temporal, not eternal, and so are his life and death. (That Nixon is
both alive and dead in the eternal present) then cannot be taken to mean that
the temporal entity Nixon exists in eternity, where he is simultaneously alive
and dead, but rather (that) one and the same eternal present is ET-simultaneous with Nixon's being alive and ... with Nixon's dying, although Nixon's
life and Nixon's death are themselves neither eternal nor simultaneous. 12

To Stump and Kretzmann, for an eternal thing to occur in time would make it
temporal, and for a temporal thing to exist in eternity would make it eternal. 13
Thus temporal things cannot exist in eternity, nor eternal ones in time. Nor (say
Stump and Kretzmann) is there a third overarching framework, in addition to
time and eternity, in which both eternal and temporal things can exist or occur. 14
This given, it seems that in (ii), x is eternally present with an eternal event of
observing a temporal y, and in (iii) y is temporally present with a temporal event
of observing an eternal x. (ii) and (iii) seem to suggest that it is because eternal
and temporal beings can observe one another that they can exist simultaneously
without existing in single overarching framework.

IV. Questions of interpretation
Were this the meaning of (ii) and (iii), ET-simultaneity could not do the
job that Boethius and Aquinas ask of it. These writers claim that God and
temporal things exist at once to help to explain how a timeless God can
perceive temporal things. 15 So they cannot in turn explain how God and
temporal things exist at once by asserting (inter alia) that God observes
temporal things, for this would render the first explanation vacuous. Stump
and Kretzmann are in a like position. Early in their discussion of ET-simultaneity, they write that
we need ... a simultaneity relationship between two relata of which one is
eternal and the other temporal. We have to be able to characterize such a
relationship coherently if we are to be able to claim that there is any connection between an eternal and a temporal entity or event. 16

If eternal and temporal things observe one another, there certainly is a "connection" between them. So like Aquinas and Boethius, Stump and Kretzmann
need to characterize ET-simultaneity without appealing to eternal-temporal
observation.
There are at least two further reasons for Stump and Kretzmann not to
appeal to ET-observation in defining ET-simultaneity. First, as they stand, (ii)
and (iii) Seem to entail that two things or events are not ET-simultaneous
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unless two observers note that this is so. But surely relations of simultaneity
exist even if there are no observers, provided that if there were observers,
they could note the appropriate relations. Second, if the mention of observation stands, the definition of ET-simultaneity becomes circular. For all x and
y, x observes y only if y causes x to have a certain experience: to analyze
observation, we must invoke causality. According to Stump and Kretzmann,
if one term of a causal relation is timeless and the other is temporal, cause
and effect must exist simultaneously.17 So to analyze ET-causal relations, we
must invoke ET-simultaneity. But then any definition of ET-simultaneity
which invokes ET-observation (or other causally-implicated ET-knowledge)
is implicitly circular, for to analyze fully the concept of ET-observation, we
must bring in the concept of ET-simultaneity.18
We must ask, then, just how vital Stump and Kretzmann's talk of ET-observation is. This talk looms large in (ii) and (iii), and so in discussing (ii)
and (iii), Delmas Lewis, Paul Fitzgerald, Stephen Davis and Richard Creel
have taken ET-observation as integral to Stump and Kretzmann's meaning. 19
But Stump and Kretzmann state in a footnote that their talk of observation is
dispensable:
It is important to understand that by ~observer," we mean only that thing,
animate or inanimate, with respect to which the reference frame is picked
out.. .. 20

Thus Stump and Kretzmann circumvent the problems just raised. The real
import of their definition is just that for every x and y, x and yare ET-simultaneous iff
(i)

x is eternal and y is temporal, and

(iv) in the unique eternal reference frame, x is eternally present and y is
present with respect to x (though not located within x's frame of reference), and
(v) in one of the infinitely many temporal reference frames, y is temporally
present and x is present with respect to y (though not located within y's
frame of reference).

In commenting on an earlier version of this paper, Prof. Stump explained
"present with respect to" in (iv) and (v) as simply meaning "neither past nor
future with respect to." As Stump and Kretzmann deny that there are such
relations as eternal or ET-pastness and -futurity, (iv) and (v) so taken can
only deny temporal pastness and futurity to x and y.21 Now temporal pastness
and futurity indeed can link only pairs of temporal entities, not a temporal
and an eternal being. But why does this fact entail that eternal and temporal
beings are in any sense co-present? They or their durations could have at
least two other relations: they could be discrete, or they could be incommensurable.
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V. Discrete times and eternity

A number of philosophers have argued that there could be at least two
discrete temporal series. 22 Let us say that if one moment is earlier or later
than or simultaneous with a second, the two moments are temporally connected. Then two discrete temporal series would be two series of moments,
A and B, such that every moment in A is temporally connected with every
moment in A, every moment in B is temporally connected with every moment
in B, yet no moment in A is temporally connected with any moment in B.
There is no contradiction in supposing that there are two such series, whether
or not one could ever have evidence that two such series exist.
Is it possible to have evidence that a temporal series other than one's own
exists? Suppose, as is plausible, that it is a necessary truth that temporal
cause-events occur at the same time as or earlier than or (if backward causation is possible) later than temporal effect-events. If temporal cause and effect
must be temporally connected, no event in one temporal series can have
effects in another series. For if this is so, then if event E in A caUses event
E* in B, it follows that E is temporally connected with E*, and so that A and
B are not discrete after all. Nor if this is so can one remember any events
from a second discrete temporal series if (per impossihile) one somehow finds
oneself there, causelessly, and then causelessly returns. For a mental event E
is a memory of some other event E* only if E* is among the causal conditions
of E. So no evidence of the existence of a second temporal series could take
the form either of memories of living in that series or of effects of that series'
events in this series.
Another possible source of evidence might be the characteristics or effects
of an event which caused the second series to exist. Specifically, someone
could suggest that perhaps as our knowledge of the traits of the Big Bang
grows, we might come to see that that event had properties which could be
best explained by saying that it led to the formation not just of our spacetime
but of at least one more discrete spacetime. However, on this supposition the
Big Bang either would or would not be located in time-series A and B. Were
it not, it would violate the condition that temporal cause and effect must be
temporally connected; hence the Bang is located in both series. But every
event in every temporal series is temporally simultaneous with itself. If this
is true, then if the Big Bang caused both A and B, there is an event in series
A (the Bang) which is A-simultaneous with an event in series B (the Bang),
and so A and B are not discrete temporal series. Instead, they are disjoint
portions of one single spacetime with a rather odd topology.
Still, one could perhaps learn by revelation that a second time-series exists.
This may depend in part on whether God is temporal. A temporal God could
not create a second time-series. For if God creates at time t, what God creates
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begins to exist at time t. So if God exists at t in time-series A and at that
point creates series B, B begins to exist at t: the first moment of B is simultaneous in A with a moment in A, and so A and B are not discrete. I cannot
see at all how a temporal God who had not created it and was altogether
causally insulated from it could know that a second temporal series existed.
If He could not know this, He could not reveal it. But God's ways are
inscrutable; perhaps He could know this, and then if He had also established
a record as a reliable teller of truths, His revealing that B exists would be a
good reason to believe that B exists. On the other hand, if God is timeless,
then He can in eternity create both A and B without its following that any
moment in A is temporally simultaneous in A or in B with any moment in
B, for His acts of creating them have no location in either temporal seriesY
If God can create a second time-series, He can know that one exists, and so
can reveal this. If an eternal God were to establish a record as a reliable teller
of truths to dwellers in A, and then were to reveal B's existence to the
A-dwellers, the denizens of A would have good reason to believe that B
exists.
We have, then, one or perhaps two ways to obtain evidence that a second
temporal series exists; there may be stilI others. But even if these all turned
out to be impossible, I would not for that reason conclude that no second
time-series is possible. I am realist enough not to be disturbed by the thought
that possibly there is a state of affairs for the obtaining of which we can have
no evidence.
If discrete time-series are possible, perhaps eternity and time are related as
such series would be. On what grounds might one reject this suggestion? The
only ground that occurs to me is this. Events in discrete time-series would
be causally insulated from one another. Theists who believe that God is
eternal believe that God's intentions have had effects in time, and so maintain
that there are causal relations between eternity and time. If there are such
relations, then eternity and time are not causally insulated, and so not discrete.
But even if this is an adequate response, Stump and Kretzmann cannot give
it. For they hold that one must first make sense of ET-simultaneity before one
can appeal to ET-causal relations.
VI. Incommensurable times and eternity

Even if discrete temporal series are not possible, that times and eternity
cannot be earlier or later than one another is compatible with their being just
incommensurable. Events A and B are temporally incommensurable (TI)
under a certain description just in case under that description one cannot have
reason to affirm or deny that A and B are temporally connected. For instance,
let A be an event locally simultaneous with my clock's striking 2 in framework of reference R, and let B be an event causally independent of A and
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locally simultaneous with my clock's striking 2 in frame of reference R*.24
Under these descriptions, A and Bare TI. Within one reference-frame, we
can say whether A and B occur at once. Again, if A causes B or vice versa,
this establishes a temporal priority between them which holds in all frames
of reference, and so holds even when A and B are considered under the
descriptions given. But there is no "super-reference-frame" with respect to
which we can say whether causally independent events described as in distinct reference-frames are simultaneous under that description. So again, as
so described, A and Bare TI. If events can be TI under a description, that
events are neither past nor future with respect to one another under a description does not entail that they are present with one another under this description. 25
Let us say that events A and Bare durationally incommensurable if A is
temporal, B is eternal and we cannot have reason to affirm or deny that A
and B are simultaneous. To Stump and Kretzmann, eternity is like another
temporal reference-frame. Stump and Kretzmann deny that the same event
can occur both in eternity and in time. Further, by their own stipulation, they
cannot appeal to causal relations between eternal and temporal events to
explain the simultaneity of the eternal and the temporal. Thus it seems that
for Stump and Kretzmann, if A occurs in eternity and B at some time, no
description is available under which they occur at once or do not occur at
once within a single reference-frame, and we cannot appeal to causal relations
between them to establish their durational order: their relations are just like
those of A and B described as occurring in distinct frames of reference. So
arguably A and Bare durationally incommensurable.
In sum, if x is temporally present (in some reference-frame) and y is eternally
present, it just does not follow that x and yare in some sense simultaneous. They
could instead be discrete or incommensurable. If so, then for eternally present
and temporally present beings to exist simultaneously, some further condition
must be satisfied. It is not clear what that further condition might be or could
be. If we cannot come up with one, this may reveal an underlying flaw in the
Stump-Kretzmann picture of time and eternity.

VII. Other problems
Two other qualms about the Stump-Kretzmann view of ET-simultaneity
deserve mention. First, Stump and Kretzmann posit four distinct simultaneity
relations, ET-simultaneity, ordinary temporal simultaneity, eternal simultaneity (linking two eternal relata existing in the same eternal present 26 ) and the
generic simultaneity relation "existence or occurrence ... together," of which
the other three relations are speciesY One would prefer to have fewer. Second, the Stump-Kretzrnann theory of ET-sirnultaneity does not rid us of (4)
and could almost be tailor-made for affirming it. That a timeless being's
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knowing what He knows is simultaneous with the present moment seems a
good reason to say that "God (eternally) knows that Paul mows in 1995" is
now true. No denial of (4) can be plausible if the now at which God knows
when Paul mows is simultaneous with the present moment.

VIII. Time and eternity: toward another view
For these reasons among others, one might want to ask if another account
of an eternal God's simultaneity with temporal things is available. Stump and
Kretzmann hold that
Nixon's life is ET-simultaneous with and hence present to an eternal entity,
and Nixon's death is ET-simultaneous with and hence present to an eternal
entity, although Nixon's life and Nixon's death are themselves neither eternal
nor simultaneous. 28

Nixon's life and his death do not occur at the same time. As both are temporal
events, they cannot be ET-simultaneous. I will now suggest that (to borrow
Stump and Kretzmann's language) "Nixon is temporal, not eternal, and so
are his life and death" and yet "the temporal entity Nixon exists in eternity,
where he is simultaneously alive and dead. "29 I will, that is, make the paradoxical suggestion that temporal events are eternally simultaneous. As Anselm puts it,
eternity has its own simultaneity, wherein exist all things that occur at the
same time ... and that occur at different times ... 3o

Following Boethius and Aquinas, Stump and Kretzmann hold that an eternal
God sees all events happen at once. 31 The statement "an eternal God sees all
events happen at once" is ambiguous. It might assert that God's seeings of
each individual event happen at once. This is how Stump and Kretzmann take
it. In their picture of time and eternity, each new dot-location on the lower
line is ET-simultaneous with the same portion of the upper line, while this
upper portion is eternally-simultaneous with itself: so this portion as seeing
one dot-location is eternally-simultaneous with this portion as seeing another.
But "an eternal God sees all events happen at once" might instead assert that
all events happen at once, and/or that God perceives that they do. This is how
Anselm took it, and how I will take it. Moreover, this looks like what Boethius
and Aquinas mean to say. The natural reading of their image of a man on a
hill seeing the whole expanse of a road is that all of the road is really there
at once to be seen.
My argument from this point onward will be philosophical rather than
historical, though. I will try to recommend this alternate picture of time and
eternity on its merits. I will show that this alternate view removes the need
to define a relation of ET-simultaneity, makes do with fewer distinct sorts of
simultaneity than the Stump-Kretzmann view, and allows one to deny (4) and
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so defend the Boethian resolution of the foreknowledge-freedom problem. I
will also block what is perhaps the most serious objection to this alternate
view.

IX. Some rival views
The statement "an eternal God sees all events happen at once" actually
admits of at least four readings. If it asserts that what God sees is all events
occurring at once, one can say either that they really do occur all at once, as
God sees them, or that they do not. If it asserts that God's seeings of events
all occur at once, one can conjoin it with either an indirect or a direct realist
theory of divine perception. Let us look briefly at these four readings.
i. If God sees all events as occurring at once even though they do not really
do so, i.e. though they are not really simultaneous in any reference frame,
God sees things inaccurately, and so is in error. But if God is omniscient,
God cannot err. So this alternative is unacceptable if God is omniscient.
ii. If we say that God's seeings occur all at once and take the indirect-realist
option, then by "an eternal God sees all events as happening at once" we
mean that all events occur at once in God's eternal experience even though
they do not do so outside that experience. We can mean by this that the direct
objects of God's awareness are not events themselves, but eternal representative entitiesY This saves God from error. On this reading, events occurring
all at once are not the object but the medium of God's "vision," and there is
no commitment to the correctness of a jUdgment that things really occur all
at once.
Still, this reading complicates our ontology by introducing eternal divine
equivalents of sense-data. Arguably it lessens the perfection of God's mode
of knowing by making it indirect rather than direct. It also leaves us the
discomfort of having to say that the wayan omniscient, cognitively perfect
God sees things is not the way or even a way they really are (though this way
of seeing does not deceive God).
iii. William Alston suggests that all God's seeings occur at once and involve
direct perception of temporal entities. On this view, events occur sequentially
in time and also all at once for God, though they do not all really occur at
once and though there are no divine sense-data. For Alston, God is eternally
directly aware of temporal events precisely as temporal and successive. Yet
God's awareness does not vary, because the whole span of time is included
in God's specious present. As Alston puts it,
In using the concept of the specious present to think about human perception,
one thinks of a human being as perceiving some temporally extended stretch
of a process in one temporally indivisible act. If my specious present lasts
for e.g. one-twentieth of a second, then I perceive a full one-twentieth of a
second of e.g. the flight of a bee "all at once." I don'tfirst perceive the first
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half of that stretch of the flight, Gild then perceive the second. My perception,
though not its object, is without temporal succession. It does not unfold
successively. It is a single unified act. Now just expand the specious present
to cover all of time, and you have a model for God's awareness of the
world .... A being with an infinite specious present would not, so far as his
awareness is concerned, be subject to temporal succession at all .. .. Everything
would be grasped in one temporally unextended awareness. 33

This move remedies the defects of (ii). But it inherits Stump and Kretzmann's
problems in defining ET-simultaneity. It also affords no resources for denying
(4). Finally, this view inherits the difficulties of the concept of the specious
present. 34
iv. Our last alternative is that all temporal events occur at once for God
and really do occur at once-that their being related to God places them in
a new relation of simultaneity in which they would not stand if (per impossihile) there were no eternal being. Now there is no temporal reference frame
in which all events occur at once. Actual causal relations place constraints
on simultaneity which all temporal frames of reference respect. If event A
causes event B, A and B occur at once in no temporal reference frame, and
so no temporal reference-frame contains a simultaneity relation linking A and
B. So if there is a simultaneity relation linking all actual events, this relation
exists in an atemporal reference frame: if all events really occur at once, they
occur at once in an atemporal reference frame. On this fourth alternative,
then, temporal events occur and temporal entities exist all at once in eternity.
This eternal simultaneity of all temporal events, I suggest, is expressed in the
Boethian-Thomist image of the man on the hill surveying the road. So rather
than defining eternal simultaneity as the relation in which two eternal events
stand if they occur at the same "eternal present," as Stump and Kretzmann
do, on this view we should define it as the relation in which any entities stand
if they occur at the same "eternal present."
I will shortly try to explain and defend this fourth alternative. Given this
section's argument, if I can show that the fourth alternative has the advantages claimed at the end of section VIII, I will have given reason to consider
it the best one. Before I launch my main exposition, though, I will argue
directly for the most paradoxical part of this position, the claim that temporal
things exist both in time and in eternity.

X. From God's spacelessness to creatures' timelessness
Traditional theists affirm that God has no spatial location. Now there can
be distance only between discrete locations in space or objects at such locations. So if God is not located in space, there can be no spatial distance
between Himself and spatial beings. If there can be no distance, there is none.
That is, we may infer from this what I will call the Zero Thesis: the distance
between God and every spatial being is zero. This zero distance is always
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between the whole of God and every spatial being. If God has no spatial
location, He has no spatial parts, and if He has no spatial parts, it cannot be
that one part of Him is at one distance from a spatial thing, and another part
is at another.
A partisan of some Aristotelian or Rylean doctrine of categories might
object to my derivation of the Zero Thesis. This friend of semantic categories
would say that as God is not the kind of thing which can be in space, God is
not the kind of thing of which we can affirm or deny distance: on this view,
"there can be no spatial distance between God and spatial creatures" is a
category-negation rather than an ordinary negation, and so its semantics are
such that it does not entail the Zero Thesis. Moreover, on this view the Zero
Thesis is actually ill-formed. For it arguably is equivalent to "there is a
distance between God and spatial creatures, and this distance is zero," a
conjunctive proposition whose first conjunct the doctrine of categories declares nonsensical.
Though I cannot discuss this fully, I find no good reason to accept these
claims. If the Zero Thesis and its equivalent are ill-formed nonsense, as the
categorist asserts, then how can we understand them well enough to tell that
they are equivalent? Further, the equivalent mentioned is problematic only if
a zero distance is a positive distance. But a distance of zero is just an absence
of distance; that we can assert a zero distance in a positive, existential form
is just a consequence of the fact that we use the word "distance" in denying
distance. Moreover, it is true and intelligible that necessarily, there is no
distance between God and any spatial thing. If a proposition is true and
intelligible, so is whatever it entails. But as what is necessarily true is actually
true, that necessarily, there is no distance between God and any spatial thing
entails that actually there is no distance between God and any spatial thing.
The Zero Thesis merely rephrases this latter claim. So to allow that the
category-negation "there is no distance between God and any spatial thing"
does not entail the Zero Thesis, we must deny either the modal rule that DP
entails P, the rule that if a proposition is true and intelligible, so is whatever
it entails, or the claim that category-negations are necessary truths. The
categorialist will not deny the third claim. But the first two seem beyond
reproach. So we are stuck with the Zero Thesis.
The Zero Thesis has a startling consequence. A particular A moves relative
to a particular B just in case first the distance between A and B (in a particular
frame of reference) is D and then both still existing it is not D. But the
distance between God and any creature is always the same: every part of God
is always at zero spatial distance from any creature, in any reference-frame.
Thus if God is spaceless, there is no motion relative to God. This does not
however deny the reality of motion tout court. Recall that according to special
relativity, motion is relative to a frame of reference, i.e. to a system of other
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entities. That there is no motion relative to God does not entail that there is
no motion relative to other things. There is nothing problematic in the thought
that an object at rest in one frame of reference (e.g. God's) is in motion in
other reference-frames.
Now I consider the following thesis eminently defensible:
M. There is no change of any sort involving spatial, material entities unless
there is also a change of place, i.e. a motion involving some material
entity.
(M) entails, for instance, that there are no thoughts in human beings unless

there are (say) changes in the brain which involve motion of micro-particles,
and that there is no change of color without (say) rearrangement of microparticles somewhere in the color-perceiving situation, and that there is no
rotation of ultimate micro-particles (if there are any) without their distinguishable though inseparable parts' changing places, etc. (M) is not a reductive thesis. Rather, it asserts only that other changes supervene on changes
of place. Nor does (M) impose any restriction on what entities are involved
in these changes of place. If (M) is true, though, then no spatial thing can
change in any way in relation to God.
There may be no non-spatial things apart from God. Or it may be that there
exist apart from God only non-spatial things which obviously cannot change,
e.g. various sorts of abstract entity. If either is so, then we have already ruled
out all change in relation to God, and no more argument is required. Partisans
of changeable angels or discarnate souls and so on might contend that these
things may exist. But even if such things exist in some possible world, they
do not exist in the possible world which is actual, at least if there is any truth
in contemporary physics.
Contemporary physics treats time as one more dimension in addition to the
dimensions of space, whatever else it may be. Now whatever is located in
one dimension is ipso Jacto located in all other dimensions of the same
continuum. Thus imagine a two-axis co-ordinate system, representing a twodimensional geometry, and a point P within this system. If one adds a third
axis to the system, P acquires a third-co-ordinate, just because the system
now has a third axis. In doing this, one in effect embeds the first two dimensions within the third dimension; whatever is located in the first two will also
have a location in the third. The same will hold for any higher number of
dimensions; as a rule, something is located in one dimension of a geometry
if and only if it is located in all. So if it is correct to represent time as another
dimension, it follows that whatever is not in space is not in time either: only
spatial things are temporal. To digress for a moment, if this is true, it is
important. For most theists affirm that God is non-spatial. Hence if in fact
only spatial things are temporal, these theists should also grant that God is
non-temporal. But rather than press this, let me return to my main argument.
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Now whatever changes first has a property F, then has a property which entails
having not-F (as when a face first is pale, then blushes). Nothing can have
contradictory properties at the same time. Hence change requires that the
subject of change be located in time: only temporal things can change. So
given the space and time of the actual world, only spatial things are temporal,
and only temporal things can change, whence it follows that only spatial
things can change. Note that I am not claiming that these conclusions hold
in all possible worlds. Perhaps there is a possible world in which time is Ilot
a fourth dimension of a physical geometry, and in this world, perhaps there
are spaceless, temporal and changeful things.
My argument, then, is that given the Zero Thesis, (M) and one very general
property of time, it follows that in the actual world there is no motion or
change relative to God. So if a frame of reference is a system of objects at
rest relative to one another, then it appears that God and all spatial objects
share a frame of reference, one in which nothing changes. Now if an event
occurs in one frame of reference, it occurs in all, albeit simultaneous with
different groups of events. So all events which occur in other referenceframes occur in the frame at rest relative to God. But how can this be, if
nothing changes there? The answer, I think, is that relative to God, the whole
span of temporal events is always actually there, all at once. Thus in God's
frame of reference, the correct judgment of local simultaneity is that all
events are simultaneous. But all events are simultaneous in no temporal
reference frame. Therefore the reference-frame God shares with all events is
atemporal.
Now this argument may seem wild. But I submit that if the Zero Thesis is
true, it is quite reasonable. For to define motion relative to an object, all one
needs is time-coordinates and a relation of relative distance, and if one can
define relative motion between two objects, one can speak of the two as
sharing or not sharing an inertial reference-frame. Perhaps this argument will
seem to some to be a reductio of the Zero Thesis; one person's modus pOllells
is another's modus tollens. But let me pose a question on behalf of the Zero
Thesis. Theists hold that though He is spaceless, God is omnipresent. The
Zero Thesis lets one give literal meaning to the claim that a spaceless God
is omnipresent. If one denies the Zero Thesis, is literal omnipresence at all
possible for a spaceless God?

XI. All objection: does occurring in eternity entail tense less time?
The suggestion that all temporal events occur in eternity and therein are in
some sense simultaneous invites the following argument:
If all temporal events occur at once, then it is false that some exist now,
others no longer exist and still others do not exist yet. Rather, since all events
exist at once, past and future events are as fully actual as present events. Thus
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the claim that all temporal events occur simultaneous with an eternal entity
and with one another wipes out the ontological distinction between present,
past and future, enforcing instead a "tenseless" theory of time.

William Lane Craig, Bowman Clarke, Richard Creel and Delmas Lewis have
recently advocated essentially this line of thought. 35 Creel, Clarke and Lewis
take this reasoning as decisive against the claim that God is timeless, as each
thinks he has good reason to consider tenseless theories of time false. Lewis
adds this twist:
In the eternal present in which God beholds all of temporal reality, there is
no contrast between past, present and future with respect to existence ... Since
God is unaware of an objective nonrelational difference between the existence of things present and the existence of things past and future, there is
no such difference as there appears to be from our perspective in time.
Otherwise God does not apprehend temporal things and events as they truly
are ... Yet God is omniscient. .. God's view of things must be the correct
view ... Hence if God is (also) eternal, then the present does not differ with
respect to existence from the past and the future. 36

Perhaps it is partly to avoid such arguments that Stump and Kretzmann give
the account they do of ET-simultaneity, avoiding the claim that temporal
events are eternally simultaneous. Now I am not going to enter the lists for
or against tense less theories of time. Rather, whatever the merits or demerits
of a tense less view, I hope to show in the following that the existence of an
eternal being and of the eternal simultaneity relation I suggest is compatible
with a tensed theory of time, according to which only present (and perhaps
past) events exist (in time), so that there is a genuine and radical ontological
distinction between present (and perhaps past) events and future events.
Craig, Lewis and the others seem to suppose that if an event occurs in
eternity, then it occurs simpliciter, and so does not remain to be brought into
existence with the passage of time. I think this conditional is false. I think
that a defender of God's eternity can assert that (in a strictly limited sense)
one and the same event is present and actual in eternity though it is not yet
or no longer present or actual in time. That is, it can be true at a time t that
an event dated at t+ 1 has not yet occurred in time, and yet also correct at t
to say that that very event exists in eternity. That all events occur at once in
eternity, I submit, does not entail that they all occur at once in time.
We can see how this can be so by applying anew the relativity of simultaneity.
If simultaneity and presentness are relative to reference-frames, then if present
events are actual in some way in which future events are not, this sort of actuality
is itself relative to reference-frames. Thus there is a (strictly limited) sense in
which the relativity of simultaneity entails a relativity of actuality, if one restricts
full actuality to present events. Consider three events, Harpo, Chico and
Groucho. Let us say that in reference frame R, Harpo and Chico occur at once
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and occur before Groucho, and that in reference frame R *, Harpo occurs
before Chico and Groucho, which are simultaneous:
Frame R
Groucho
Harpo
Chico
past -+ -+ -+ -+ -+ future

I
I
I
I

Frame R*
Harpo

Groucho
Chico
past -+ -+ -+ -+ -+ -+ -+ future

It seems to me that in this case, Chico is actual in R before Chico is actual in

R*. By saying that Chico is actual or occurs in R "before" it is actual in R*, I
do not imply that there is some single temporal "superframe" overlapping Rand
R*, relative to which we can construct a single time-series on which to order
events occurring in the two frames, and relative to which Chico's-occurrencein-R is before Chico's-occurrence-in-R*. Nor do I mean to suggest that Chico
in R is in any way really distinct from Chico in R*, or that Chico's occurrence
in R is in any way really distinct from Chico's occurrence in R*. I mean only
to point to this fact: in both Rand R*, Harpo is before Groucho, and in R, Chico
occurs with Harpo, while in R*, Chico occurs with Groucho.
Let me put this more precisely, subscripting temporal terms like "now" to
indicate the reference frame with respect to which I am speaking (e.g.
"nowR"). To help make my point, let me also introduce a non-temporal relation P of causal priority. This relation will generate causal series defined
without reference to temporal position or modality. P-series will be constituted of just those causal relations which are absolute and invariant within
all temporal reference frames. In the example given, for instance, Harpo is
P-prior to Groucho, and Chico is not a member of this segment of this P-series,
though unless Chico has neither causes nor effects, Chico occurs somewhere
in some P-series. We will say, however, that if an event such as Chico is
simultaneoUSR with an event in a P-series, that event occurs in R at the P-point
of the P-series event with which it is simultaneousR.
With these devices, let me describe the situation diagrammed above. In this
situation, relative to the P-series, Chico occurs (is actual) in R before Chico
occurs (is actual) in R*; the P-point at which Chico occurs in R is P-prior to
the P-point at which Chico occurs in R*. Also, in this situation, if in R it is
nOWR the P-point at which Harpo occurs, that Chico is nOWR actual in R does
not entail that Chico is nowR* actual in R* (though it does follow that Chico,
isR*, waSR-or will beR- actual in R*). The relativity of simultaneity to reference frames brings with it a relativity of presentness, and so a relativity of
actuality. The claim that Chico is actual with Harpo in R is compatible with
the claim that Chico is actual with Groucho in R*. Each is a true description
of the single physical reality as it exists within a particular real referenceframe.
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One might think to use this relativity of actuality to argue that the apparent
difference in ontological status between the present and the future is merely
illusory.37 The argument would go this way: whatever occurs simultaneously
with an already-occurring event itself already occurs. In R, Harpo and Chico
occur at once. In R*, Chico and Groucho occur at once. Both frameworks'
facts of simultaneity are genuine. Hence although Groucho is in the future
according to R, Groucho is already occurring (thanks to R*)-and so a future
event is already occurring. Tensed theories of time entail that no future events
are already occurring. Hence tensed theories of time are false, and there is
no ontological difference between the present and at least some future events.
The slip in this argument, a defender of tensed time can say, is that it does
not take the framework-relativity of actuality seriously enough. It presumes
that there is just one attribute (or whatever), actuality-simpliciter, and that
things simply either have this or do not. A tensed theory of time can deny
this, and hold instead that a distinction between present (and perhaps past)
events and future events is real but framework-relative. If present actuality
is ontologically special, then as there is no absolute simultaneity and so no
absolute, framework-independent now, there is no absolute present actuality.
There is merely present actuality in this framework and that; things are not
just actual-simpliciter or not, but are actual-in-R, actual-in-R* and so on.
There is only one Chico and one occurrence of Chico, but this one occurrence
is actual in many different frameworks, and so has many different actualities.
If events in the future in our reference-frame "already" are present or past in
some other reference-frame, still they are not already actual in our referenceframe. Only this latter would constitute an actual future of the sort tensed
theories of time must deny.
That an event is present and actual at t in a frame R does not entail that it
is present and actual at any particular time in another frame R *. If we take
eternity as one more frame of reference, then, we thus can say that a temporal
event's being present and actual in eternity does not entail that it is present
and actual at any particular time in any temporal reference frame (though it
does follow that this event is, was or will be actual in all temporal reference
frames). Again, an event occurs in eternity simultaneously with all other
events, but this does not entail that the event occurs at the same time as all
other events in any other reference-frame. Rather, in eternity, all events occur
at once, and they occur in sequence in temporal reference frames. Events are
present and actual all at once in eternity, but present and actual in sequence
in other reference frames. An eternal frame of reference, I submit, just is one
in which all events occur at once, even though they occur sequentially in any
temporal frame of reference. /fChico can occur with Groucho in R*, and this
does not wipe out the ontological asymmetry between the present (and past)
and the future, Chico can occur with all events in eternity without destroying
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the ontological asymmetry between present or past and future. Thus on the
implications of eternity for time, I take up a position midway between Stump
and Kretzmann on the one hand and Lewis et at. on the other. Counter to
Stump and Kretzmann, I submit that if there is an eternal being, all temporal
events etc. are really simultaneous in eternity. Counter to Lewis and the
others, I maintain that temporal events' occurring at once in eternity does not
entail that they do so in time, or that tensed theories of time are false. Also
counter to Lewis, I suggest that there is no fact of present occurrence of which
God is unaware. For the occurrence of things in eternity with God, which He
perceives there, is the very occurrence by which they occur in time, though
there occurrences are successive rather than all at once.
That in God's frame of reference all events occur simultaneously does not
entail that God does not know all the facts about simultaneity which obtain
in temporal reference frames. God's being located in just the eternal frame
of reference does not put a limit on what He knows. From any referenceframe, one can extrapolate what judgments of simultaneity would be correct
in other reference-frames. Presumably, then, an eternal God can have this
knowledge in His own way. So (as Stump and Kretzmann observe 3R ) for every
temporal now, God knows what is happening now (i.e., simultaneous with
that now), and for every eternal now, God knows what is happening now
(namely, everything). I am unsure whether (as Stump and Kretzmann suggest)
this constitutes an adequate response to the question of whether a timeless
God can know what is happening now-that is, can know what is expressed
by propositions involving ineliminable temporal indexicals. But as this is a
problem for any version of the doctrine of divine timelessness rather than for
my specific version of it, I postpone discussing it to another paper. 39

XII. An objection: must whatever occurs in eternity be eternal?
My proposal naturally prompts a question: if events exist in eternity, then
why aren't they eternal beings? A short answer is that one can take being
temporal and being eternal as mutually exclusive modal properties. One can
say that an entity is temporal iff it is the kind of thing which can be located
in a series of earlier and later events, states, processes etc., and that an entity
is eternal iff it cannot be so located. If being temporal is a modal property,
then even if an entity is located in an eternal frame of reference, it remains
fully temporal, because it retains its modal properties. One can also answer
the question by noting that any temporal event located in eternity is also
located in time. This remains true even if the event is in eternity, and this is
again an adequate basis for distinguishing temporal from eternal entities.
Stump and Kretzmann deny that eternal and temporal entities can "exist or
occur together" in eternity or time, because they think this would make
temporal things eternal and eternal things temporal. In accepting this conse-
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quence, they implicitly accept a different view of what it is to be temporal
and what it is to be eternal. On their account, to be temporal is to be located
in time, and to be eternal is to be located in eternity.40 So on the StumpKretzmann view, my second suggestion amounts to claiming that all temporal
things are also eternal things.
But there is a clear sense in which a temporal thing located in eternity
would not be an eternal thing. A temporal being in temporal reference-frames
has its duration by successively enjoying parts of it. Thus within eternity (a)
its fourth-dimensional extension or duration would have parts.41 (b) not all
parts of its duration would occur at the same present. This would entail at
least that if this is a conscious thing, it could at any point in its duration be
aware of some other points in its duration only by memory or precognition
(if such a thing exists). (c) its duration's parts would be ordered as earlier
and later. (d) in most cases, its duration would have a beginning and an end.
There thus is a distinction to be made between being located in eternity and
being eternal. To be eternal is to have a partless duration in a single infinite
extended present. Even if every being with a partless duration is located in
an eternal reference-frame, it is at least conceivable that beings without
partless durations be located there (this paper gives a conception of it, and it
is not obvious that that conception is incoherent), and it makes sense to say
that even if they were, they would differ significantly from truly eternal
beings. If this is conceivable, being located in eternity does not entail being
eternal. As the present account of temporality and eternality respects the fact
that this entailment fails and the Stump-Kretzmann account does not, the
present account is preferable.
Earlier I suggested that our problems with Stump and Kretzmann's definition of ET-simultaneity may manifest an underlying problem in their picture
of time and eternity. The problem may lie here. Because Stump and
Kretzmann take temporality and eternality to be locational rather than modal
attributes, they cannot allow temporal and eternal beings to be located together in a single frame of reference. Thus they are forced to try to define a
sort of simultaneity (ET-simultaneity) which is not within but between reference-frames. They could not say more about this than that iff temporal entities
are temporally present and eternal entities are eternally present, they are
co-present (and it is not clear that one can say more about this). We saw
above that this definition does not succeed.

XIII. Time and eternity
All of the foregoing has led up to some proposals about the natures of time,
eternity, temporal beings and eternal beings which I will now develop. I will
first state these proposals informally, then develop some technical terms, then
use these technical terms to state them more precisely.
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I suggest defining a temporal entity as one which can stand in relations of
temporal precedence and simultaneity (i.e. be part of what McTaggart called
a B-series), and an eternal entity as (inter alia) one which cannot bear these
relations. As I have argued, this definition allows a temporal entity to remain
temporal even if it is present in eternity. That an eternal being cannot be
located in a B-series entails that an eternal entity is necessarily eternal.
If temporal events occur within an eternal reference frame, they must occur
all at once, even though within temporal reference frames the occasions of
their actuality are ordered sequentially. If they did not occur all at once, there
would be change within eternity, first one event and then another being
actual. But as we have seen, where there is no time, there can be no change.
Now a four-dimensional timeless solid can harbor "change" in the sense that
at one point along its temporal dimension it is F, and at another such point it
is not F. But this is not the sense of "change" or of existing at two points in
time which I mean to exclude. The 4D solid A always (timelessly) involves
two facts about A and F, that A is F at t and that A is not F at t+ 1. Where
there is change in the meatier, "purely temporal" sense, first A is F, and there
is no other relevant fact linking A and F, and then A is not F, and there is no
other relevant fact linking A and F. It is in this sense of change that what
exists in eternity cannot change. In eternity, events are in effect frozen in an
array of positions corresponding to their ordering in various B-series. 42 Yet
these same events really do occur in the meatier, purely temporal sense within
all temporal reference frames, as do changes of the kind eternity precludes.
As eternity does not allow change, we can define an eternal reference-frame
as a frame such that all events which occur within it must occur simultaneously,
even if they may occur non-simultaneously in other reference frames, and a
temporal reference frame as one in which events can fail to occur simultaneously.
If we do this, again, we define an eternal reference-frame in terms which allow
that events may occur in eternity which also occur in time.
Let us now develop the machinery to say all this more precisely. First, let
us so understand "now" that occurring now does not entail having a position
in a B-series of earlier and later events. That is, let us in effect take "now"
and "occurring now" as primitive terms univocally applicable to temporal
and eternal things. Anyone who does not want to render the phrases "eternal
now" or "eternal present" flat-out contradictions or equivocations must do
this.43 This move does not create a "third mode of existing" embracing the
eternal and the temporal; eternal-temporal remains an ultimate and exclusive
disjunction. Nor does this move entail that occurring-now is absolute rather
than framework-relative. A semantic point can hardly dictate a physical conclusion. And even if it could, how could stipulating that occurring now does
not entail location in any B-series entail that all located nows must have the
same location in all B -series?
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Second, let us define two locutions, A- and B-occurs. Let us say that an
event E A-occurs iff E occurs now. Let us also say that event E B-occurs iff
E's location in a B-series of earlier and later events is t, and it is now t.
Obviously, whatever B-occurs occurs now, or A-occurs. But I reject the
reverse inference. If whatever occurred now B-occurred, occurring now
would entail having a location in a B-series.
Let us now define two relations, A- and B-simultaneity. Two events are
B-simultaneous iff they have the same location in a B-series in the same
reference frame. Intuitively, A-simultaneity is a relation of occurring at the
same now. Two events are A-simultaneous if they are B-simultaneous and
they B-occur. Also, all A-occurring events not located in a B-series but
located at the same atemporal now are A-simultaneous.
An event A-occurs and does not B-occur if it is not located in a B-series,
or else if it A-occurs and is located in a B-series but does not A-occur at its
B-series location. If an event occurs and does not occur at a B-series location,
it occurs in some atemporal now. This is what we have when a temporal event
occurs in an eternal frame of reference. Of course, there is a sense in which
an event which occurs in eternity occurs at its place in its B-series. For
presumably it has a location in a timeless array of events which represents
atemporally the temporal sequence of the B-series, and in temporal referenceframes, the event B-occurs at this location.
Note that these definitions do not involve special temporal or eternal kinds
of simultaneity, though in fact nothing eternal can B-occur or be B-simultaneous with something else. These definitions do permit us to speak of simultaneity between temporal, eternal and both eternal and temporal things;
temporal things can be A- and B-simultaneous, and eternal things can be
A-simultaneous with one another and with temporal things. More important,
these definitions do not make eternal-temporal simultaneity into something
sui generis. On the Stump-Kretzmann account, while ET-simultaneity is an
instance of generic simultaneity, it is still a unique kind of simultaneity which
can obtain only between an eternal and a temporal being. It thus seems
somewhat ad hoc and suspicious. On the present account, the A-simultaneity
which obtains between an eternal God and temporal entities is univocal with
the A-simultaneity which obtains between temporal entities. Finally, while
Stump and Kretzmann's theory of simultaneity involves four distinct simultaneity relations, the present theory involves only two, or perhaps three if one
contends that it tacitly includes generic simultaneity. This is a gain in simplicity.
With this background, let me offer these tentative definitions:
R is an eternal reference-frame iff R is such that necessarily, all events
which A-occur in R A-occur A-simultaneously-in-R. Alternately, R is an
eternal reference-frame iff within R, the relations "earlier" and "later" can
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hold only between locations in the atemporal analogue of a B-series, and not
between A- or B-occurrences.
R is a temporal reference-frame iff it is not the case that R is such that
necessarily, all events which A-occur in R A-occur simultaneously. Alternately, R is a temporal reference-frame iff within R, the relations "earlier"
and "later" can apply not only between locations in the atemporal analogue
of a B-series but also between A- and B-occurrences.
K is an eternal entity iff K can A-occur/exist but cannot B-occur/exist; that
is, if K can exist now but cannot be a located in a B-series. Alternately, K is
eternal iff K can be A-simultaneous but cannot be B-simultaneous with other
entities.
K is a temporal entity iff K can B-occur/exist: that is, if K can have a
location in a B-series.
If these definitions hide no nasty surprises, they let us say that a temporal
thing can occur within an atemporal reference frame without compromising
the absolute distinction between temporal and eternal things or referenceframes. They let us say that an eternal frame of reference includes an A-simultaneous array of events located sequentially in temporal B-series. They
also let us say that events A-occur in both eternity and time, but B-occur only
in time. Yet temporal events which A-occur in eternity also B-occur in time,
and so occur in eternity as ordered in timeless analogues of their B-relations.
XlV. Applications

The notion that we are always present with God in eternity may have
interesting religious implications. Whatever religious implications it has must
be lived with regardless of the precise version of the doctrine of timelessness
for which one opts since there is no before or after in eternity or for an eternal
being, there is nothing of God's eternal existence which is "before" His
creating the world: given that He is eternal and has created, He has eternally
had the world for company whether or not it is literally present in eternity.
The notion that we are always present with God in eternity may also be of
philosophical use. Some philosophers have puzzled over how an eternal entity
can act on and perceive events in time. If the definitions above are viable,
we may be able to dissolve this puzzle. For perhaps we can argue that an
eternal entity acts on those temporal entities which are present with it in
eternity, and these actions have consequences for temporal entities as they
exist in time. (We could say that actions in eternity are prior to consequences
in time not temporally but "by nature.") Perhaps, that is, an eternal deity need
not act on temporal things in time to act on temporal things. Again, perhaps
an eternal thing need only be eternally co-present with a temporal thing to
observe it. Of course, these moves leave us the task of explaining causal
relations between timeless entities. But perhaps we can make headway on
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this via counterfactuals expressing dependence. The theory of time and eternity developed here vindicates Boethius' response to the freedom-foreknowledge problem. Like Stump and Kretzmann's, this view explains why an
eternal God's simultaneity with the events of our past does not locate Him'
in time in our past. The Stump-Kretzmann explanation is that ET-simultaneity
just is not the sort of simultaneity which has this consequence. On the present
view, God's believings are simultaneous with events of our past only in a
non-temporal reference-frame: that is, in a frame where nothing is past
(though things' temporal order is respected in another way). Thus in any
frame in which there is a past, it is false that God's believings are in the past,
for in that frame, God's believings are simultaneous with no temporal event.
Another challenge to Boethius arose from the claim that an eternal God's
believings are as if in our past, and the claim that
4. "God (eternally) knows that Paul mows in 1995" is now true.

(4) appears to follow from
6. God eternally knows that Paul mows in 1995

by a rule of tense-logic, that (letting "PrO" symbolize the tense-logical operator "it is now the case that") for any formula P, regardless of its tense, P
entails Pr(P). But I want to suggest that it does not, and that (4) is in fact
false, so that if an eternal being exists, this rule of tense-logic (and perhaps
others) must be qualified.
Let us begin from the fact that on the present view, eternity is another now
in addition to all temporal nows, and so is a locus logically like a time, to
which one can index the truth of propositions. We use the system of tenses
to relate times or timelike loci to sentences' times of utterance; for instance,
using the present tense often indicates that that of which one speaks is going
on while one speaks. If in time, eternity is a now in no way simultaneous
with any temporal now, then no ordinary tense relates our times of utterance
to eternity. Nor can we infer from this that talk of the eternal is tenseless.
What is true tenselessly (e.g. that 2+2=4) is true at all times. 44 What is true in
eternity is true, but true at no time. To speak of what is the case in eternity, then,
one must distinguish an eternal-present tense in addition to present, past and
future tenses. 45 Using the eternal-present tense indicates that that of which one
speaks is the case, but is not the case before, during or after one's speaking. This
description of the eternal-present tense does not distinguish between a tense
appropriate to events in a temporal series discrete from ours and a tense appropriate to events in eternity. But this is as it should be. For neither eternity nor a
second temporal series is located in our time, and so the difference between them
is irrelevant to our tense system.
The Boethian in particular should be glad to distinguish an eternal-present
tense. For the Boethian wishes to reject (4). If (4) is false, then there is a time
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at which (6) is not true. If a proposition is tenselessly true, it is true at all
times. So it follows that (6) is not tenseless. If (4) is false, further, (6) is not
in the ordinary present tense. For if it were, (6) clearly would entail (4). It
seems then that without an eternal-present tense, a Boethian cannot explain
the tense-status of the verb in (6). If one grants an eternal-present tense, it is
plausible to say that the verb in (6) is in this tense.
If (6) is in the eternal-present tense, (6) is true, but not true at any time
before, during or after the present. Now if this is so, (6) is relevantly like a
claim about a temporal series discrete from ours. Letting "B" name such a
series, let us ask whether it could be that
4a.

~God

knows (in B) that Paul mows in

1995~

is true now.

If (4a) is true, God now knows in B that Paul mows in 1995. But if this is
so, there is a time in our time-series which is a time at which God has
knowledge in B: that is, there is a time common to our time-series and B,
counter to hypothesis. Hence (4a) is false. But if (4a) is false, then since (4a)
is quite like (4), so is (4). So if (6) is in the eternal-present tense, (4) is false,
and the Boethian treatment of freedom and foreknowledge stands. But even
if there is no eternal-present tense, and the tense-status of (6) is just unclear,
(4) is still false provided that (as is true on the present account but not on the
theory of ET-simultaneity) in time, eternity is in no sense simultaneous with
any time, and so is relevantly like a discrete time-series. Now even if all this
is true, we can still say e.g. that God now knows that Paul mows in 1995.
But we can say such things only because we too stand in the eternal now,
and so can use "now" to refer to the eternal now rather than any temporal
now. We can use "now" this way if it has a sense something like "at a time
or timelike locus simultaneous with this utterance," for this utterance is
simultaneous in temporal reference-frames with various times, and simultaneous in the eternal reference-frame with the eternal now.
The present theory allows that if a proposition P is true at t, "P at t" is true
at eternity. So on the present view, truths corresponding to truths about future
human free actions are also true in eternity. But these are not true in eternity
before we perform the actions in eternity, for nothing in eternity is before
anything else. Nor are they true at times before our free actions; eternity is
not in our past or as if in our past. Of course, that a proposition about a human
action is true in eternity at a particular point in an eternal B-series array lets
us infer just when the action occurs in time (as from a proposition's truth at
2:00 in R plus appropriate further information one can determine just when
it is true in another reference-frame). But what we infer is just that the
proposition is true when our action makes it true, not that it was true before. 46
Nor does the fact that the proposition's truth is eternally at just a certain point
in a B-series infringe human freedom. This entails at most that a certain action
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is performed at some time, not that it could not have been avoided. I submit,
then, that the theory of time and eternity developed here rescues the Boethian
approach to freedom and foreknowledge.
Finally, at the outset of this paper I raised a question: can the timelessness
of God be reconciled with the Biblical picture of God and creatures as present
to one another? Some philosophers have in effect argued that if God is present
with us, He must be present with us in time. I have tried to suggest that God
may be present with us because we are present with Him in eternity-and yet
are fully temporal. On these assumptions, timelessness and the Biblical picture can indeed be reconciled. 47
Fordham University
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